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Abstract. In this paper, I seek to diagnose the sources of our dissatisfaction with 
answers to the question of the meaning of life. I contend that some of these have 
to do with the question (its polyvalence and persistent vagueness) and some 
have to do with life and meaningfulness themselves. By showing how dissatis-
faction arises and the extent to which it is in-eliminable even by God, I hope to 
show that we should be satisfi ed with our dissatisfaction. 
I.
‘What is the meaning of life?’ To ask this question seriously is to know 
that no answer capable of pithy formulation will be entirely satisfying. 
‘Th e meaning of life is to give and receive love.’ ‘Th e meaning of life is to 
gain in wisdom and knowledge.’ ‘Th e meaning of life is to fi nd union with 
God.’ ‘Th e meaning of life is to escape the suff ering inherent in the cycle 
of rebirth.’ At the stage of seriously asking the question of the meaning of 
life, one will already have heard and rejected these and a multitude of al-
ternative answers, rejected them at least as defi nitive of, as saying all that 
there is to be said about, life’s meaning. If one picks through the scrap pile 
of answers one has thus generated, of most puzzlingly melancholic inter-
est amongst them will be any which one found wanting in completeness 
whilst believing that there was nevertheless unsurpassable value in the 
modes of life that they licensed – for example, if one believes in God, the 
answer involving union with Him; if one believes in suff ering inherent in 
a cycle of rebirth, the answer involving escape from this cycle.
In the case of a religious answer, if one is oneself of that particular 
religious persuasion, one naturally hesitates in having the thought ‘Th ere 
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must be more to it than that’ when one reaches the object of ultimate 
religious reverence. If one believes in God, for example, one inclines to 
worry that the thought must fi nally be misplaced here, as there could be 
no ‘that’ more impressive – more ultimately satisfying of every valuable 
aspect of one’s being – than union with God. But I speculate that one 
thinks the thought nonetheless, even here. And I speculate that the same 
goes, mutatis mutandis, if one is of another religious persuasion. If one 
believes in the ‘noble truth’ that all existence is characterized by suff ering 
and has committed oneself to the ‘noble eightfold path’, which one be-
lieves will lead one ultimately to escape from it, this too, I hazard, strikes 
one as, even if complete and suffi  cient as a guide to life, incomplete and 
insuffi  cient as an answer to the question of the meaning of life. Of course, 
if one eventually fi nds oneself face-to-face with God, one will not, at that 
time (if time may still be spoken of in such a context), be thinking, ‘Th ere 
must be more to it than this’; and if one ultimately escapes existence al-
together, one will not be able in such a non-state to think anything at all, 
so a fortiori one will not then be thinking ‘Th ere must be more to it than 
this’. But the fact that, in such states/non-states, such thoughts would be 
obliterated does not make any less well-grounded now the thought in 
question, for the thought is not that such things cannot happen or that 
their happening wouldn’t then remove any dissatisfaction one might feel 
about one’s life and indeed everything else, but rather that ending up at 
such points cannot be all that there is to making meaningful the lives 
that led up to them.
My purpose in this paper is to explain the persistence of this dissat-
isfaction with answers – even religious answers – to the question of the 
meaning of life. Th e fi rst step in my explanation is the claim that there 
are several legitimate meanings of ‘meaning’, and indeed of ‘life’, and thus 
when one asks ‘What is the meaning of life?’, one asks an ambiguous 
question, or – perhaps better – one asks an assemblage of largely overlap-
ping, but signifi cantly diff erent, questions at once. To list but a few of the 
concerns which fi nd their home in the question:–
One is asking what, if any, consequences there are of an aspect or 
period of an individual’s life, the individual’s life as a whole, humanity’s 
life, or life per se. One is asking what, if any, purposes are served (or exist 
whilst failing to be served) by life in one or more of these senses. One is 
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asking what signifi cance, if any, in a greater (potentially non-purposive) 
scheme of things life in one or more of these senses has. ‘Why are we 
here?’ ‘Why am I here?’ One is asking what, if any, ideals are instantiated 
in an aspect or period of a life or life in one or more of the larger senses – 
‘What, if anything, does it ‘stand for’?’ One is asking what, within life in 
one of these senses, is desirable or valuable in itself, what – if anything – 
makes life worth living, worth going on with, for the individual or group 
living it. One is asking whether or not life in one or more of these senses 
contributes positively to various sorts of extrinsic value in the world or 
beyond. One is asking whether it is in some sense emotionally or spiritu-
ally satisfying, or perhaps the proper object of such an emotion/mood 
even if it is not yet had. 
Th ese are just some of the questions that fi nd expression in ‘What 
is the meaning of life?’ Having merely briskly stated only some, my hy-
pothesis of polyvalence is not justifi ed in anything but the most impres-
sionistic of ways. But I trust that each of the questions in the previous 
paragraph will have elicited in the reader a thought that might gain ex-
pression in ‘Yes, that is in part what I was asking when I asked “What is 
the meaning of life?”’ and thus have supported the hypothesis. 
Th e hypothesis of polyvalence gives us a partial explanation of our 
dissatisfaction with the answers to ‘the’ question of the meaning of life. If 
there are indeed so many questions of the meaning of life, it is no wonder 
that no pithy formula can contain the answer to all of them. When one 
realizes the polyvalence of the question, one must then have some sym-
pathy with the sages whose answers one has discarded as unsatisfying in 
coming to the point of this realization.
Consider the predicament in which a sage fi nds himself or herself 
when asked, ‘What is the meaning of life?’ Insofar as he or she is able 
to make determinate sense of the question and not retreat into Delphic 
aphorism by way of answer, he or she must disambiguate it in what 
strikes him or her as the most profound way and then answer it under 
that interpretation. Perhaps he or she then answers it correctly under 
that interpretation, but – be that as it may – as, depending on how it is 
disambiguated, ‘the’ question of the meaning of life is answered correctly 
with very diff erent answers, so each particular answer proff ered by a sage 
is likely to strike any individual hearer of it as at best only partial. And so 
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it is that even when one thinks of a sage as having singled out something 
of value in life with his or her answer (perhaps even having singled out 
something of unsurpassable value), one cannot help but think that what-
ever it is that he or she has described cannot be all that there is to making 
life meaningful – ‘Th ere must be more to it than that.’ And so it is that 
this thought that one cannot help but have is right. 
Polyvalence also explains another thought which I hazard occurs 
with great frequency in response to the many answers proff ered to the 
question by sages past and present: ‘Th ere’s something in that’. Perhaps 
almost as frequently as one feels oneself dissatisfi ed with a particular 
answer, one thinks of the unsatisfactory answer as nevertheless having 
some cogent truth contained within it. If there is a God and he is as 
those who believe in him characteristically suppose, the meaning of life 
is unlikely, one supposes, to have nothing whatsoever to do with fi nding 
union with him. If ultimate reality instead consists of suff ering inherent 
in a cycle of rebirth, then the meaning of life is unlikely, one supposes, to 
have nothing whatsoever to do with escaping from this cycle. Whatever 
one’s religious views or lack of them, gaining in knowledge and wisdom, 
giving and receiving love, and a host of other things which have been of-
fered by sages as keys to the meaning of life are, one will almost certainly 
believe, valuable and, believing this, one will suppose that it is unlikely 
that they are entirely irrelevant to the question of life’s meaning. No an-
swer to the question of life’s meaning that has been propounded by sages 
is wholly satisfactory, but few are wholly unsatisfactory either. Again 
then, the hypothesis of polyvalence explains how this is so.
If the claim of polyvalence is correct, then the methodology that must 
suggest itself in investigating ‘the’ question of the meaning of life is as 
follows:-
We should disambiguate the various meanings of ‘meaning’ and ‘life’ 
as they fi gure in our minds as we ask the question of life’s meaning. We 
should show how, under the various interpretations of ‘the’ question we 
are hence enabled to disaggregate, we are or are not in a position to judge 
of life that it has meaning or does not have meaning and perhaps the 
extent to which it has or does not have meaning. And, fi nally, in those 
senses of the question where we are in a position to make judgements of 
the meaningfulness of life, we should make those judgements, give the 
answers. But there will be problems implementing this procedure.
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II.
As someone asking the question of the meaning of life, even asking it 
seriously and aft er much thought, it is unlikely one will have a secure 
and detailed prior grasp of the various diff erent things one is asking. 
Were one to be given a list of possible interpretations of the question by 
the person to whom one was asking it and asked by him or her to specify 
some or all of the interpretations from that list as the meaning or mean-
ings one already had in mind, one would not be able to compare the list 
one had just been given with a pre-existent list of one’s own, and quickly 
tick off  various meanings. Rather, a more synergistic process would take 
place between the list one had been given on the one hand and one’s 
own, somewhat ill-formed, prior thoughts on the other. One would fi nd 
oneself saying things like, ‘You know, I hadn’t really thought about it, but, 
now I see it there on your list, I think that meaning a is a part of what 
I was asking, or – perhaps better – a part of what I now wish to ask about 
when I put to you again the question of the meaning of life.’ Look back at 
the list of questions which I briefl y gave as illustrative of those that fi nd 
expression in ‘What is the meaning of life?’ I hazard you will have this 
sort of reaction to at least some of them.
Th ere are of course limits on the interpretations that the question of 
the meaning of life may carry, limits imposed by quite general consid-
erations concerning the nature of language. As with all other questions, 
there are sorts of linguistic behaviour which someone might display in 
response to the question of the meaning of life that would be taken by 
all competent language-users as indicative, not of having a particular – 
and perhaps unorthodox – interpretation of the question, but rather as 
indicative of not understanding it at all. So, we need not make space at 
the table for all comers, indeed we should exclude some ‘meanings’. Th e 
next question then is, how shall we decide who to exclude?
First, and least controversial as a criterion for exclusion, the inter-
pretations of the question must be logically coherent before we consider 
them; there are many meanings to the question, but there are no mean-
ingless meanings. Th at’s the thing about meanings, they have to mean 
something; and that’s the thing about logical incoherence, it fails even 
to mean something. We need not make space at the table then for those 
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‘sages’ who tell us that they are going talk about the meaning of life but 
speak only gibberish thereaft er. 
Whilst, as a criterion for exclusion, logical incoherence is uncontro-
versial, quite who this criterion excludes when applied properly is some-
times controversial. Th us matters are not quite as clear cut when it comes 
to applying this criterion in practice as one might initially have hoped 
given its clarity in principle. For example, Sartre contends that interpre-
tations and answers to the question of the meaning of life which involve 
God involve logical incoherence; thus, he would maintain, they need not 
even be considered. However, other serious thinkers contend that it is 
Sartre’s answer to the question of the meaning of life which is incoher-
ent and thus not needful of consideration. And we shall thus have to do 
some philosophical work to decide if either or both deserve a seat at the 
table in due course.
Secondly, and potentially more controversial as a criterion for exclu-
sion, the interpretation of the question has to address at least an aspect 
of our concerns when we ask the un-disambiguated question, ‘What is 
the meaning of life?’ Of course, if the claim of polyvalence is right, any 
particular answer will address these concerns only partially. But inter-
pretations must at least address some aspect of our concerns in raising 
the initial question if they are to be considered further as interpretations 
of and putative answers to that question rather than, at best, answers to 
other questions which are beside our concerns when we inquire into the 
meaning of life. 
Even with these two criteria in play, setting some parameters on what 
will be acceptable as disambiguations of the question of the meaning of 
life, a worry may linger. Th e wisdom of sages seeking a place at the table 
is not left  unchallenged; each has to be minimally coherent in the inter-
pretation they give to the question and in their answer to it and the in-
terpretation they off er has to address at least some aspect of the concerns 
of those of us who ask the ‘raw’ question. But this still leaves unchal-
lenged the ‘wisdom of the crowds’, as it were, the wisdom of the rest of us 
who are asking the question. Might we not worry then that we’ve set the 
table up in the wrong place, that the real meaning of the question ‘What 
is the meaning of life?’ is, for all we know, something entirely diff erent 
from what we, the vast majority of competent language-users, take it to 
be? Perhaps, unbeknownst to us in the crowd, the question ‘What is the 
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meaning of life?’ really does mean something to which the answer is or 
might be ‘42.’ But such a worry makes no sense; such a thought gestures 
hopelessly towards no genuine possibility. 
Someone who maintained that when people ask ‘What is the mean-
ing of life?’ they are really asking – even if only in part – a question to 
which 42 might be the answer, would not have given the question of the 
meaning of life any legitimate interpretation. How can we be so sure? 
Because it is we, the crowd asking the question, who create the identity 
of the question with those concerns; they are our concerns and so we are 
authoritative over them and the question they form. Even in the case of 
a polyvalent question such as this – where there is no single hegemonic 
interpretation, but rather a family of legitimate interpretations – which 
of the potentially infi nite number of interpretations counts as a legiti-
mate member of the fi nite family is something which is determined by 
the refl ective responses of the competent language-users posing the orig-
inal question. Words must mean what their users characteristically take 
them to mean and thus the question of the meaning of life, even if am-
biguous, cannot mean something which it is obvious to every competent 
language-user it does not mean, even partially. And one thing which it is 
obvious, comically obvious indeed, to us that the question ‘What is the 
meaning of life?’ does not mean, even partially, is any member of the set 
of questions to which ‘42’ might be an answer. (We, the crowd, are sov-
ereign over the identity of question, but of course we are not sovereign 
over the identity of the answer to it, or at least it would require another 
and more controversial argument to establish that we were. Legitimate 
interpretations of questions are legitimate just in virtue of being taken to 
be so by competent language-users. But correct answers to questions are 
not correct (or at least not usually correct) just in virtue of being taken to 
be correct by competent language-users.) 
All of this, it may be admitted, has painted the picture in rather too 
stark a contrast of black and white. Th ere will be some sages seeking 
a place at the table who we can clearly see are speaking to an aspect of 
our concerns (‘It’s to grow in wisdom and knowledge’; ‘It’s to fi nd union 
with God’), and there will be some who we can clearly see are not (‘It’s 
42’). But there will also be those for whom this issue is not determinate. 
Sometimes this indeterminacy will be epistemic, capable in principle of 
being removed by further interrogation of the person giving the answer. 
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But sometimes it will not. Th ere will remain a certain amount of indeter-
minacy even aft er the most careful refl ection and synergistic interaction 
with them, as a result of what we might call ‘persistent vagueness’ in our 
question. To some then we shall ultimately wish to say something along 
the lines of, ‘Well, that’s “sort-of ” an aspect of what I was getting at when 
I asked the question of the meaning of life’. Some interpretations of the 
question, we might say, seize on that which is central to our concerns 
when we ask it; others, on what is more peripheral; and, at the outermost 
perimeters of the question, the borderlands of the concerns we express 
when we ask ‘What is the meaning of life?’ and thus the legitimacy of in-
terpretations of it and the cogency of answers to it are not clearly marked. 
Th is is the second source of dissatisfaction with answers to the question 
of the meaning of life, persistent vagueness in the original question.
Whilst it undoubtedly complicates matters, in itself persistent vague-
ness is not unprecedented or even particularly troublesome. Persistent 
vagueness of a similar sort arises over many issues and, as with poly-
valence, to be forewarned about it is usually suffi  cient to be adequately 
forearmed against it. Indeed seldom does it signifi cantly impede progress 
even when one is not forewarned. Of course one may fi nd oneself feeling 
dissatisfi ed with the somewhat vague results that are all that can – even 
in principle – be obtained in response to a vague question, but insofar 
as one realizes that this feature of the answer/answers is a function of 
persistent vagueness in one’s original question, one will become satisfi ed 
with any dissatisfaction arising from this source; one will stop thinking, 
‘Th ere must be more to it than that’. (Th is sort of satisfi ed dissatisfaction 
is analogous then to the comprehensible incomprehensibility that Kant 
claims is the best we can expect when investigating the relationship be-
tween the noumenal and phenomenal self.)
‘So is that it?’ one might now ask. ‘If we disaggregated the various 
legitimate meanings of the question of the meaning of life, legitimate by 
reference to appearing, even if only on synergistic refl ection, to speak to 
at least some aspect of our concerns when we raised the original ques-
tion of life’s meaning; if we appreciated the centrality of the concerns 
raised by these interpretations relative to our refl ective understanding 
of our concerns when asking the original question (taking into account 
persistent vagueness); if we discovered in turn the answers to each of 
the questions into which the original was thus ‘broken down’ or discov-
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ered why answers to these sub-questions were not available to us; if we 
did all that, would we then reach a completely satisfying (or ‘satisfyingly 
dissatisfying’, as we put it) answer to the question or rather then a list of 
answers to the list of questions – in any case, one which didn’t leave us 
thinking, “Th ere must be more to it than that”?’ 
III.
Baggini approaches the question of the meaning of life in a similar fash-
ion to that suggested heretofore and indicates that he would be favour-
ably disposed to the thought that this would indeed be suffi  cient. He says 
this of his approach:–
[It is] ‘defl ationary’, in that it reduces the mythical, single and mysterious 
question of ‘the meaning of life’ to a series of smaller and utterly unmys-
terious questions about various meanings in life. In this way it shows the 
question of the meaning of life to be at the same time something less and 
something more than it is usually taken to be: less because it is not a grand 
mystery beyond the reach of most of us; and more because it is not one ques-
tion but many.1
Th is is not the view of this paper. Whilst I concede that Baggini is right 
that the question of the meaning of life may be broken down into other 
questions, he is wrong in what he thinks fl ows from this. Many of these 
other questions are not in any signifi cant way ‘smaller’ than the original 
question. Some at least are mysterious and seem destined to remain so 
for the foreseeable future. And there is sadly more work to be done than 
drawing up a chart with answers to all of them or blank spaces for the 
mysterious ones if we are to reach as satisfactory an answer to the ques-
tion of the meaning of life as is possible. Th is is because polyvalence and 
persistent vagueness in the question are not the only sources of dissatis-
faction with answers to ‘it’ and thus removing ambiguity and proff ering 
various answers to the various questions into which ‘it’ is broken down 
to whatever degree of determinacy the persistent vagueness permits, 
1 J. Baggini, What’s it All About? Philosophy and the Meaning of Life (London: Granta, 
2004), 3
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or explaining in particular cases why such answers are unknowable to 
us, will not remove all such dissatisfaction. Having broken the question 
down into its component parts, we shall fi nd ourselves with good rea-
son to suppose that these parts need to be put back together again; with 
reason to think that they need to be put back together again in the right 
way; and with reason to think that judging the right way is not going 
to be an easy task. Let us skip ahead in our imagination to the end of 
the process of disambiguating the question and answering ‘it’ to locate 
the sources for dissatisfaction additional to the two on which we have 
focussed thus far. 
Let us imagine then that we have in front of us a summary of our 
fi ndings, laid out in the form of a chart. Down one side is a complete list 
of the diff erent legitimate meanings that can be given to the question 
‘What is the meaning of life?’ and, alongside each one, we have either 
a philosophically satisfying explanation of why we are not in a position 
to answer the question as so interpreted, one which explains why it must 
remain in this sense mysterious, or a philosophically satisfying argument 
for why a particular answer is the one we have best reason to believe is 
the correct answer to the question as so interpreted. Over at least some 
sections of this chart the issue of persistent vagueness will have made 
itself felt. It is diffi  cult to know how this should be represented in our 
imagination. Nevertheless, let us imagine that the chart has been com-
pleted and now stands in front of us awaiting our inspection. What will 
we fi nd as we look at it?
First, whilst in advance of actually having conducted the investigation 
that has led us to be able to draw up such a chart, we cannot be sure that 
each of the entries in it will not strike us as equally cogent to our undif-
ferentiated concerns as expressed in our original question, ‘What is the 
meaning of life?’, we rightly suppose that they will not. As already men-
tioned, some of the interpretations of our question which we may, on re-
fl ection, have allowed through as legitimate we may have done so whilst 
nevertheless marking them down as less central to our concerns than 
others. We shall hence wish to ‘rank’ entries in the chart, at least roughly 
(persistent vagueness will prevent a completely determinate ordering). 
We might think of those higher up the chart as being the senses of the 
question which are determinately more central than those lower down. 
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Secondly, whilst in advance of actually conducting the investigation 
that has led us to such a chart we cannot of course be sure that these 
answers to the question will not be completely separate – causally, meta-
physically, and conceptually – from one another, we rightly suspect that 
they will not be. And this issue generates more diffi  culties than the fi rst. 
Even before conducting our investigation into the various meanings of 
‘the’ question of the meaning of life, it is hard to believe that it is a mere 
accident of language that has resulted in all these meanings being carried 
by what is, on the surface, one question. And, if we were to conduct the 
investigation, we would see that this suspicion is well grounded.
As we unpacked these various meanings, we would notice vari-
ous sorts of relationship between the diff erent senses in which life (in 
its various senses) may or may not be meaningful. Th ese relationships 
mean then that the original question cannot be broken down into other 
questions the answers to which are then left  entirely loose and separate 
from one another, to be ordered in the chart merely by reference to their 
individual centrality to our original concerns when raising the question 
of life’s meaning. As we looked down the chart, we would fi nd relation-
ships such as the following: an individual’s life can only have meaning in 
sense p if it also has meaning in sense q; but it can only have meaning 
in sense q if humanity’s life in general has meaning in senses q and r. 
And so on. Th ese sorts of relationships then might, on refl ection, lead 
us to wish to ‘pull up’ or indeed de facto ‘push down’ some things on 
such a chart. A new iteration of what we have called the ‘synergistic’ in-
teraction between question and answer would need to be undertaken 
as a result of one fi nding oneself wanting to say things like, ‘I would 
have said that meaning in sense p was not very central to my concerns, 
whereas meaning in sense q was really central, but now I realize that 
one’s life having meaning in sense p is a necessary condition of its hav-
ing meaning in sense q; I shall need to revisit that issue.’ Indeed ‘revisit’ 
seems unlikely to be quite the right term; ‘visit’ seems likely to be more 
appropriate: there is likely to be even more persistent vagueness at this 
stage in the process of re-ordering the chart than there was at the fi rst, as 
it is even less likely that one will have a clear prior idea of how important 
and thus immovable by synergistic interaction one regards the central-
ity or lack of centrality of the various meanings one now fi nds related 
to one another. (However, on the plus side, some of the vagueness that 
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was persistent at the earlier stage might be removed at this one. For one 
might fi nd oneself saying something like, ‘I would have said that mean-
ing in sense x was only ‘sort of ’ something I was asking about when 
I asked the question of life’s meaning, but now I see that it is so closely 
related to meaning in sense y, which I’d always thought of as very central 
indeed, I see that it too really is a central part of my concerns; some of 
the indeterminacy I had thought of as persistent vagueness at an earlier 
stage in my investigation into life’s meaning now disappears.’) Whilst the 
extra level of vagueness in itself might leave one feeling dissatisfi ed anew 
with the results as they now found themselves re-ordered on the chart, 
again, as at the earlier level, refl ection on the source of this (vagueness 
in one’s original question) should lead one to feel satisfi ed with any such 
dissatisfaction so arising. However easily one reconciles oneself to this 
dissatisfaction, one would not be done with reasons for dissatisfaction 
even yet. Moving on then.
IV.
Some of the relationships which investigation revealed would enable mu-
tual support of diff ering kinds between diff ering sorts of meaningfulness 
or meaningfulness of the same sort when held by life at diff erent levels 
of generality (a period or aspect of an individual’s life, an individual’s life 
as a whole, humanity’s life, or biological life per se); these would draw to-
gether into clusters senses in which life in one or more of its senses could 
be meaningful. But some would not. Some would do the opposite; they 
would drive wedges between diff ering senses in which life in one or more 
of its senses could be meaningful. It is from this point – that some would 
do the opposite – that yet another spring of potential dissatisfaction bub-
bles up: as we redrew the chart, we would realize that there is no way for 
life in every sense of the term to be fully meaningful in every sense of 
the term and this is a qualitatively new source of dissatisfaction, in that 
it is dissatisfaction stemming from one’s appreciation of a feature of life, 
not a feature of the question one is asking about it. To become satisfi ed 
with one’s dissatisfaction with answers to the question of the meaning of 
life as they emerge from this source then would require a diff erent move 
from any canvassed heretofore. Fortunately, such a move can be made. 
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But these are issues on which we need to spend a moment or two if we 
are ever to be satisfi ed with the dissatisfaction which stems from them. 
In his lecture ‘L’existentialism est un humanism’, Sartre hit upon 
a sense of meaningfulness in which, I suggest, life can only be fully 
meaningful in a Godless universe. Sartre overstates his case in that if 
there is a God, our positions mightn’t yet be akin to that of paperknives 
(objects the function of which is entirely determined by factors exterior 
to them); they might be more akin to those of Executive Vice-Presidents 
than ‘Junior Widget Affi  xers’ and thus we still have at least some mean-
ing in Sartre’s sense of meaning – self-creative autonomy. But we cannot 
have as much meaning in Sartre’s sense as we could have had were Athe-
ism true. We won’t be ‘self-employed’, as it were, free to style ourselves 
as President, Chairman of the Board, and anything else that might catch 
our fancy. At the most fundamental level – like it or not, realize it or not 
– we will be ‘working’ for someone else. Th is lack of ultimate self-creative 
autonomy is not something that theistic religions can fairly be accused 
of having hidden from us as an implication of their worldview. Follow-
ing a law one believes to have been written by God on tablets of stone 
thousands of years before one’s birth; following someone one believes 
to have been the perfection of that law, the incarnation of God; hum-
bly submitting oneself to the commands of God as revealed to his last 
Prophet: none of these could strike one, even for a moment, as manners 
of living in which, as Sartre might have put it, one’s existence is being 
supposed entirely to precede one’s essence. Rather, each overtly supposes 
that a pattern has been laid down for us by another, God. Th is may not 
perhaps be a pattern for every detail of our lives. But it will be a pattern 
for at least signifi cant areas of our lives, areas of our lives we may well 
fi nd ourselves wishing we were more free over, indeed areas which, such 
religions are also unanimous in teaching, it is in our (at least post-lapsar-
ian) human nature to wish ourselves more free over. For example, each 
of these religions has slightly diff erent understandings of how marital 
relations are to be conducted. But these religions speak with one voice 
on the issue of adultery. It is impermissible; it has not been left  up to us 
to construct for ourselves, should we so choose, an essence whereby we 
are adulterers, the religion only instructing us to ‘live authentically’ by 
whatever choice on this issue we may happen to make. Th is is, of course, 
not the case on Sartre’s view. Should one so choose, one could go in for 
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some ‘blue skies’ thinking, indeed behaving, in this area as in all others; 
man being responsible only to himself for his life, he is free to create 
for himself the essence of an adulterer and live accordingly. Such free-
dom is denied to those who subscribe to one of the theistic religions and 
thus very natural human urges will, on occasion, lead such people to feel 
alienated from certain aspects of the way of life they believe themselves 
to be compelled to lead. 
Let us leave Sartre for now and turn to consider a passage from Tol-
stoy’s autobiographical ‘Confessions’, a passage where, in telling us of 
a searing moment of self-realization in his own life, he implicitly reveals 
a very diff erent understanding of what would be required for life to be 
meaningful. 
I [had] lived for thirty or forty years: learning, developing, maturing in body 
and mind, and . . . having . . . reached the summit of life from which it all lay 
before me, I stood on that summit . . . seeing clearly that there is nothing in 
life, and that there has been and will be nothing. . . .Diff erently expressed, 
the question is . . . “Is there any meaning in my life that the inevitable death 
awaiting me does not destroy?”2 
It is futile to pretend that Tolstoy has not hit on a nerve with these obser-
vations. Yet futility has never been a bar to the pretensions of Philosophy. 
Flew tells us this:–
Tolstoy was one of those inclined to hold, as if this were a necessary truth, 
that nothing can matter unless it goes on forever; or, at any rate, eventu-
ally leads to something else which does. But there really is nothing at all 
ineluctable, or even especially profound, about this particular value com-
mitment.3
Flew is right that things can be meaningful in several perfectly legiti-
mate senses (for example, fulfi lling a purpose in some larger scheme of 
things) even if they do not last forever or do not lead to things which do 
(the larger scheme might not require such results), but Flew is wrong if 
he thinks, as he seems to think, that there is no sense of meaning at all 
2 I have rather chopped up Tolstoy’s text. Th e full version may be found in several 
translations free of charge online, by looking up ‘L. Tolstoy, A Confession’. 
3 A. Flew, Th e Presumption of Atheism (London, Elek Books, 1976), 160-161
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in which death – if it is the permanent cessation of existence – detracts 
from life’s meaning. Consider this passage from Craig:-
If each individual person passes out of existence when he dies, then what 
ultimate meaning can be given to his life? Does it really matter whether he 
ever existed at all? It might be said that his life was important because it infl u-
enced others or aff ected the course of history. But this only shows a relative 
signifi cance to his life, not an ultimate signifi cance. His life may be important 
relative to certain other events, but what is the ultimate signifi cance of any of 
those events? If all the events are meaningless, then what can be the ultimate 
meaning of infl uencing any of them? Ultimately, it makes no diff erence.4
Craig nicely sidesteps Flew. Craig acknowledges that death as complete 
annihilation would not eliminate all meaning in the sense of bringing 
about signifi cant consequence (Craig calls what would remain ‘relative 
signifi cance’), but points out that were everything ultimately to come to 
nothing, this would remove ‘ultimate signifi cance’, would in that sense 
render all that had gone before it meaningless. Tolstoy, and – perhaps 
in a more nuanced way – Craig have then, I suggest, hit upon a sense in 
which individual humans’ lives, if they are permanently terminated at 
death and their only eff ects are those which they have in this world, are 
meaningless. Th is is a sort of meaninglessness which can only be elimi-
nated entirely if it is eliminated at the ultimate level. And it can only be 
eliminated at the ultimate level if a certain type of religious hypothesis 
is true. It could be eliminated there, for example, were there a God such 
as the one which Jews, Christians and Muslims worship, a God who pre-
serves and magnifi es into eternal life all that is most valuable in our lives 
as led this side of the grave. 
So, if we live in a world where there is no God, then out individual 
lives are, at least potentially, more meaningful in the sense that Sartre 
discusses and not ultimately meaningful in the sense that Tolstoy and 
Craig have in sight. If we live in a world where there is a God, then our 
individual lives are ultimately meaningful in the sense that Tolstoy and 
Craig discuss and less meaningful in Sartre’s sense. We may conclude 
then, whatever our religious beliefs or lack of them, that no single indi-
4 W. Craig, ‘Th e Absurdity of Life Without God,’ in e.g. E. Klemke (ed.), Th e 
Meaning of Life (Oxford: OUP, 2000), 42. 
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vidual’s life can, by dint of some of the relationships between diff erent 
sorts of meaningfulness, be fully meaningful in all the senses which we 
may separate out from one another and reasonably care about. Th is ines-
capable feature of life may be unsatisfying to us, but in that – as we have 
now seen – it is a feature which not even an omnipotent being could 
remove, we should be satisfi ed with any dissatisfaction arising from it. 
Either God’s there of metaphysical necessity or He’s not there of meta-
physical necessity. Th us, of logical necessity, our individual lives cannot 
be fully meaningful in every sense of the term. 
V.
A question now arises. If an individual’s life may have more meaning 
in a particular sense, x, only at the expense of its having less meaning 
in another sense, y, is there – sometimes or always – a sense of mean-
ingfulness, z, by which the other senses – x and y – may in principle be 
ranked and it be determined that, say, a life fully meaningful in manner 
x is, despite that, less ‘deeply’, as we may put it, meaningful than one only 
partially meaningful in manner y? For at least some values of x and y, 
we have reason to suppose that there is in fact such a deeper sense of 
meaningfulness; we have reason to believe that some lives, which are 
only partially meaningful in one sense, are more deeply meaningful than 
others, which in turn are fully meaningful in other, perfectly legitimate, 
but – our refl ective intuitions tell us – shallower senses. We think that 
the charity worker who knowingly brings minimal but non-negligible 
good into the world before dying and being forgotten about leads a more 
deeply meaningful life than the infamous mass-murderer whose crimes 
are later made subject of much popular culture and give impetus to new 
legislation on gun-control, even though the killer’s life had more mean-
ing in some senses of meaning – signifi cant causal consequence, for ex-
ample – than the charity worker’s life. 
Holding in mind this thought, let us return to consider the imagi-
nary chart of the fi ndings that we would reach at the end of an ideal-
ized investigation into ‘the’ question of life’s meaning as conducted by 
the methodology suggested so far. It will be recalled that we are thinking 
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of the chart as having one column representing the various legitimate 
interpretations of ‘the’ question, the various questions into which the raw 
question ‘What is the meaning of life?’ may be broken down. And, beside 
this, another column, which contains, for each entry in the fi rst, either 
an explanation of why the question as so interpreted is one we are not 
in a position to answer or an answer to the question as so interpreted. 
Up until now, we have thought of the chart as being roughly ordered 
by what, on some refl ection, appears to us to be the centrality of these 
interpretations to our concerns when asking the original question of the 
meaning of life (roughly ordered, as there is some persistent vagueness 
in this ordering as a result of this sort of vagueness in our original ques-
tion). Despite any vagueness, perhaps some people’s charts would end 
up determinately ordered in diff erent ways from others by this process. 
When we were considering merely the centrality of interpretations of 
the question to people’s concerns, then, as in general each person is him-
self or herself the greatest authority on what concerns him or her, so 
we would appropriately have demurred from saying that at most one 
of these determinately diff erent orderings was right. But, having moved 
on from centrality to our raw concerns to the issue of deepness, we now 
need to be more prescriptive; this is because the most central concern (or 
really overarching ‘uber’-concern) that each of us seriously asking the 
question of the meaning of life has is plausibly the concern to discover 
the deepest sense of meaning, and, that being our most central or ‘uber’-
concern, to have our other concerns restructured if necessary in the light 
of this discovery. 
We can see this most readily by imagining ourselves having discov-
ered the deepest sense of meaning, and then looking back from this van-
tage point on the fi rst steps of the journey that has led us to it. One might 
then say something like, ‘I always thought that meaningfulness in sense 
x was really central to what I was asking about when I asked about the 
meaning of life, but as I am now able to see that it is quite a shallow sense 
of meaning – that sense y, for example is far deeper than x; I wish then 
to reverse my initial ordering.’ One would not say, ‘I realize now for the 
fi rst time that one’s life having meaning in sense x is its having mean-
ing in a shallower sense of meaning than its having meaning in sense 
y, nevertheless it is really meaning in sense x that is what still interests 
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me most when I ask, “What is the meaning of life?”’ So it is that by this 
stage in the process of investigation the ranking by refl ective (but philo-
sophically uninformed), centrality of an interpretation of the question 
to one’s concerns when fi rst asking the question will be displaced by the 
refl ective (and philosophically informed) deepness of the interpretation 
and answer to the question, by what one now believes one has good rea-
son to suppose should concern one in asking the question. Because there 
is, aft er all, an underlying and deeper sense of meaning, a sense which 
holds together at least some of the shallower senses of meaning which 
may be disambiguated, and because it is this sense which one would thus 
say is what one was really most centrally asking about all along when 
one asked the original question, ‘What is the meaning of life?’, centrality 
will be displaced by deepness as a principle of ranking in the fi nal ver-
sion of the chart of one’s fi ndings. But now a new problem arises. When 
it was just centrality to our refl ective, but philosophically uninformed, 
concerns, we could in general merely defer to the refl ective intuitions 
of competent language-users to resolve such issues insofar as persistent 
vagueness allowed them to be resolved. But now we are discussing deep-
ness, we cannot do this; the answers to the various questions into which 
‘the’ original question of life’s meaning may be defl ated are related in 
various ways and some of the ways in which they are related depend on 
various metaethical and metaphysical issues, so we cannot, until we have 
settled those issues, know quite how we should ‘re-infl ate’ the question of 
the meaning of life; certainly the refl ective intuitions of competent lan-
guage-users are not guide enough. Th e deepest question of the meaning 
of life is one the precise identity of which and one the answer to which 
waits on metaethics and metaphysics. Th at being so, pending the conclu-
sion of substantive work in these areas, we have another reason to expect 
to continue to be dissatisfi ed with the answer(s) to the question(s) of the 
meaning of life; these answers will need to be left  related to one another 
by links which are in some cases hypothetical (e.g. ‘If Consequentialism 
is true, then y is a deeper sense of meaningfulness than x; if not, then….; 
‘If there’s a God, then x is a deeper sense of meaningfulness than y; if not, 
then …’; and so on). Is this waiting on metaethics and metaphysics then 
the fi nal reason for our dissatisfaction with answers to the question of 
life’s meaning? It is not.
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VI.
Let us suppose for a moment that all we have discussed hitherto has 
been accomplished; we see metaethics and metaphysics sub specie aeter-
nitatis and re-order our fi ndings accordingly; we – for example – decide 
to push up or pull down our list some senses of meaningfulness, ones 
which appeared to have a certain place in the list to us at an earlier stage 
but now, by virtue of a revealed tension, we believe can be seen to be 
determinately above or below their original position; we re-order now 
solely according to the principle of deepness, allowing our earlier judge-
ments of centrality to be in some cases misguided, given that our prima-
ry purpose when asking the question of the meaning of life was to ask the 
question of the deepest meaning of life. As we return to look down the 
chart now, we may put an issue which now faces us as our noticing that 
meaningfulness in certain senses can only be ‘bought’ at the expense of 
meaningfulness in other senses and thus we may wish to think of ‘trade 
off s’ between diff ering types of meaningfulness. Some of these trades 
off s will have been determined in advance of any choices we may make; 
for example, the trade off  between meaningfulness in Sartre’s sense and 
meaningfulness in the Tolstoy/Craig sense will already have been fi xed 
by whether or not there is a God (or something functionally equivalent 
in the relevant respects) and to what extent this God (or His equivalent), 
if He (it) exists, has fi xed our essences, as Sartre would have put it, prior 
to our existences. But, unless the fact is that there’s a God (or some such) 
who (which) has micro-managed us down to the level of paperknives (as 
no theists actually believe), other trade off s will be dependent on choices 
which we remain free to make. 
Situations may arise then which raise in one’s mind the practical 
question of how one would be best advised to trade off  meaningfulness 
in one sense for meaningfulness in another if one were to wish to make 
one’s life as deeply meaningful as possible overall. Th e chart we are now 
imagining ourselves in possession of will of course be ranked with the 
deeper senses of meaningfulness higher than the shallower ones, but it 
would be implausible to say that it was worth sacrifi cing any amount of 
a shallower sort of meaningfulness in order to achieve any increase in 
a deeper one, however slight. So, in addition to deepness, we shall wish 
to consider what we might call overall meaningfulness and consider how 
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best to construct this notion out of the materials to hand. One natural 
thought to have when considering how to represent this would be to 
wonder if it might be done mathematically, with some formula describ-
ing a function that appropriately weights the diff erent sorts of meaning-
fulness, giving heavier weightings no doubt to the deeper sorts, and thus 
combines them into a quantity which we then do best (by the standards 
of making our lives as overall meaningful as possible) to maximize. But, 
on refl ection, one will wish to resist this natural thought for the follow-
ing reason. 
Whilst, despite certain issues of incommensurability, some ‘trade off s’ 
between diff ering sorts of meaningfulness may indeed be understood 
more or less straightforwardly mathematically, some sorts of meaning-
fulness seem to require the eschewing of a strategy of maximization al-
together. We may make this point more forcefully by utilizing some of 
the points that Williams has made in raising the ‘integrity’ objection to 
Utilitarianism. 
Roughly, we may say that an individual’s life has integrity in Wil-
liams’s sense just if he or she is unwilling constantly to subject his or her 
everyday commitments to a higher-order principle which instructs him 
or her to maximize something. A life led without integrity in this sense, 
would, it must be conceded, have an overriding and unifying worldview, 
and in that sense be very meaningful: an individual’s life is sometimes 
said to have had great meaning just in virtue of its having had some 
dominant aesthetic, moral, ideological or religious goal, an overarching 
long-term project that – by acts of the will on the part of the individual 
concerned – selected and ordered the lower-order projects to which he 
or she committed himself or herself. So it is that we can speak of such in-
dividuals’ lives as a whole as standing for something, exemplifying some 
unitary value. By way of examples: Gauguin’s life stood for the aesthetic 
imperative; Lenin’s for the communist revolution. Even if we look for 
our example to a Utilitarian on whom Williams’s original point would be 
most pressing, we should concede that his or her life has more meaning 
through its unwavering commitment to Utilitarianism than the rather 
more ‘morally-feckless’ lives led by the rest of us. But two points may 
be made here. First, Williams would surely argue with plausibility that 
such a life would be one from which the person living it was inevitably 
alienated and would thus, at the same time as being meaningful in the 
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sense of having a unifying overarching project, fail to be meaningful to 
the person concerned in other senses. Secondly, this alienation would be 
all the more pressing an issue were there to be no ideology overarching 
one’s life choices other than the determination to make these choices in 
the manner which led to one’s life being maximally overall meaningful. 
Th ere is a parallel to be drawn here with the Paradox of Hedonism; those 
who tried in each of their choices to maximize their lives’ overall mean-
ingfulness would end up leading less overall meaningful lives than at 
least some of those who directly aimed at something else. Th is being the 
case, it is at least possible (and I would contend plausible) that the no-
tion of overall meaningfulness, even for one who has all epistemic barri-
ers removed – seeing all relevant metaethics and metaphysics sub specie 
aeternitatis as we have put it – would not yield a determinate answer for 
at least some ‘trade off ’ issues and this would be a source of dissatisfac-
tion additional to those we have mentioned heretofore. But we have of 
course faced parallel issues of indeterminacy before in investigating the 
meaning of life, and we face similar issues every day, so again we should 
be satisfi ed with any dissatisfaction arising from this source (or at least 
no more dissatisfi ed with this than we are with everyday issues). 
What is more troublesome is that there is another source of dissatis-
faction with answers to the question of the meaning of life which stems 
from a genuinely regrettable feature of our condition, one which we have 
swept out of view for the last few sides so as to see other features more 
clearly: this side of the grave at least, we never can reach the position of 
viewing all the relevant aspects of reality sub specie aeternitatis. 
One of the ways in which an individual’s life can be more or less 
meaningless for him or her is the extent to which he or she is disabled by 
circumstances not of his or her own choosing from doing what seems to 
him or her reasonable given the beliefs that he or she has. Th us even if 
we suppose that there is in fact one correct ranking (even if it be partially 
indeterminate) of diff ering sorts of meaningfulness and we can discover 
it (as we cannot) and even if we suppose that two people (or the same 
person at two times) might agree on this ranking (as they may not), even 
then, between these two people (or one at two times), if they do not have 
access to the same facts about the world, there can arise tensions of this 
sort between diff erent sorts of meaning and thus there be no way for life 
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considered as the lives of two or more individuals (or one at two or more 
times) to be fully meaningful. 
By this stage, one is likely to be at least somewhat discouraged. Rather 
exhaustedly, one might ask, ‘Is that, at last, it? If we disambiguated the 
question; if we got our metaethics, metaphysics, and all relevant facts 
straight (of course, this is impossible for creatures of our epistemic abili-
ties – at least ante-mortem – and thus there will be problems of the sort 
generated by diff ering things making some lives meaningful in the sense 
of being subjectively reasonable for the persons living those lives from 
those which make it meaningful in the sense of being objectively reason-
able); if we ranked our chart by reference to how, on philosophical inves-
tigation, deep these various senses of meaningfulness were revealed to us 
to be; if we looked at all the trade off s internal to issues of life’s meaning-
fulness; and if we worked out, as determinately as the issues allowed, for-
mulae with which to maximize meaningfulness for those internal trade 
off s where the notion of maximization was appropriate (whilst appreci-
ating that maximization would not be the right notion to employ at the 
highest level, for ‘integrity’-type reasons, when trying to achieve a life of 
what we may by then have called overall meaningfulness); if we appreci-
ated the diffi  culties generated by combining individual lives (with their 
diff ering sorts of meaningfulness) into collectivities and across lifetimes; 
if we did all that, would we then at last fi nd a completely satisfying an-
swer to the question of the meaning of life?’ 
No. We would not be fi nished with reasons for dissatisfaction even 
then. But we would, fi nally, have found as satisfying an answer as 
the question of the meaning of life permitted, and thus the dissatisfac-
tion which we would continue to feel would not now take as its proper 
object the answer which we had before us; it would refocus itself on the 
question.
VII.
Th e fi nal reason for dissatisfaction is that, once all the above work had 
been done (not that, as we have seen, it can be done – this side of the 
grave at least), we would realize that the question of the meaning of life 
is not as signifi cant a question as we had hoped it to be. By the stage of 
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getting to this answer we would realize if we do not already realize that 
there are many things in life that we rightly value alongside and in some 
circumstances above its meaningfulness, even above its overall meaning-
fulness. We have already seen the issue of trade off s arising internal to 
considerations of meaningfulness (trading meaningfulness in one sense 
for meaningfulness in another), but this is a trade off  of a qualitatively 
new kind. It may be better for us, not just if we trade off  some meaning-
fulness in one sense in order to achieve greater meaningfulness in anoth-
er, deeper, sense, for example, but if we do not lead all-things-considered 
the most overall meaningful lives that we can lead. A relatively overall 
meaningful life may well be worse for a person than a relatively overall 
meaningless one. (Plausibly Van Gogh’s life was worse for him than that 
pictured by P. G. Wodehouse as being enjoyed by Bertie Wooster, but 
Van Gogh’s life was more meaningful in every sense of the term than 
Wooster’s.) 
Th e question of the meaning of life is an important question, but it 
is not the only important question; it may be in some sense an ultimate 
question, but it is not the only ultimate question in the sense that the 
answer to it dictates the answers to all other questions of importance. 
Th e meaning of life is not to know the meaning of life and thus even 
someone who did know the meaning of life better than another might 
well end up leading a less meaningful life than that other. What is per-
haps more surprising, but is also, I suggest, the case, is that a person who 
knew the meaning of life might end up rationally choosing to lead a less 
overall meaningful life than that other. Th is is because the truly wise try 
fi rst and foremost not to lead meaningful lives, but to lead good ones. 
But to establish that and to talk about its attendant dissatisfactions would 
require another paper.5
5 I am grateful for the critical comments of John Cottingham on a draft  of this 
paper.
